Austin’s How to Do Things with Words radically challenges the assumption that language merely describes reality, arguing instead that many utterances actively perform social acts. His central distinction is between constative utterances, which may be true or false, and performative utterances, which accomplish actions when spoken in appropriate circumstances . Examples such as “I promise”, “I bet”, “I name this ship” or “I do” in a marriage ceremony show that words can create obligations, institutions and social facts rather than simply report them. However, Austin insists that performatives depend upon felicity conditions: there must be an accepted procedure, suitable participants, correct execution, sincerity and subsequent conduct consistent with the act . A promise made without intention is not false in the ordinary sense, but “unhappy” or defective; similarly, a marriage utterance fails if spoken by the wrong person or in invalid circumstances. A clear case study is the legal oath: its force does not lie in describing an internal belief, but in publicly binding the speaker through convention, authority and recognised procedure. Austin’s theory therefore reveals language as an institutional practice, where meaning is inseparable from action, context and social recognition. Ultimately, he transforms philosophy of language by showing that speech is not merely representative but performative, capable of producing duties, identities and realities through words themselves.